The next stage for India after INS Vikrant should be a modern carrier and submarines

The first aircraft carrier made in India, INS Vikrant, was commissioned on September 2, 2022, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s watch. The occasion marks a significant turning point in India’s march toward the growth of its naval might. It was built by Cochin Shipyard Limited. The accomplishment is admirable, but it must not be used as an excuse to ignore the fact that maritime power is a broad concept that includes navy, merchant marine, and infrastructure assets like ports and interior linkages.

The journey is not only never-ending but also exceedingly expensive. However, it is one that might be compensated for by the economic gains associated with marine trade.

Increasing maritime power
India’s inherent ability to increase maritime power stems from its long history of seafaring. India has a wealth of nautical experience, making it one of the top three countries in the world in terms of human capital for the naval and merchant marine in the current context. Such a resource is priceless, but technology improvements can readily match it. Ironically, India has struggled to expand its naval capabilities while being outperformed financially in the construction of commerce ships.

INS Vikrant, even though it took 20 years from Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) permission to commissioning, serves as a fortunate example of how indigenous naval capacity-building offers better promise.

The need for a third aircraft carrier is strong since it is the only vessel capable of shielding the surface fleet from enemy submarines and planes if it must operate far from India’s continental mass. Due to its prominence and capacity to convey force, it is unparalleled in its usefulness in both peaceful and emergency situations. There should be no question that India’s naval strength must be considered in order to make it easier to secure its maritime commerce routes from hostile forces. Both surface and underwater capabilities will be needed for such safekeeping.

The aircraft carrier supports the function of submarines in the subaqueous realm in addition to serving as the primary platform for defending surface ships. If the Navy is required to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean Region, it is a vital asset. The claim that air cover may be achieved by missile defence systems mounted on ships ignores the offensive capabilities of sea-based aircraft. Additionally, the aircraft carrier can serve as the foundation for maritime cooperation with friendly nations in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical idea.

Why a third aircraft carrier is necessary
So, why does India still need a third aircraft carrier given that it will have two?

Let’s ignore the claim that the nation will lose its precious experience and knowledge if we don’t start producing the third aircraft carrier. Another important justification for a third aircraft carrier has to do with how frequently they need maintenance. These cycles come in a variety of lengths—short, medium, and long—and become longer as people age. The lengthy cycle may last up to two years or longer. Upgrades are carried out during maintenance cycles, which can extend them further. The third carrier may not be an option, but rather a requirement, given their critical position and India’s expanding geopolitical concerns.

Obstacles to developing undersea capability
The desire to develop submarine capability competes with the decision to build a third aircraft carrier. The ability is offensive and enhanced by stealth gained through the capacity to cruise undetected for extended periods of time at deep depths. The offensive potential of submarines is evident, and one that is perfectly suited for sea denial, given that India’s continental peninsula and island regions straddle the maritime commerce lanes of the Indian Ocean. Additionally, contemporary submarines are equipped with missiles that can hit ground targets.

The submarine arm of India has existed for more than 50 years. Between 1967 and 1974, eight Soviet submarines of the Foxtrot Class were introduced.

Between 1986 and 2000, four German Type 209 submarines and ten Russian 10 Kilo Class submarines were built after it. Mazagon Docks Shipbuilders Limited produced two of the Type 209s (MDL). All human capital was wasted, and the industrial chain went unused, due to a lack of follow-on orders.

The government gave the go-ahead for a 30-year plan build 24 conventional submarines in 1999. Later, this was changed to include 18 conventional and 6 nuclear submarines. Six under Project 75, six under Project 75(I), and six under Project 76 were to be built, according to the design. The goals of Projects 75 and 75(I) were to increase design and manufacturing capacity as well as promote technology transfer. In Project 76, submarines with Indian design were to be built.

Air-Independent-Propulsion (AIP) systems were to be installed on the 75(I) and 76 to improve underwater endurance, reduce noise, and improve stealth.

Project 75 is over two decades behind schedule. The sixth Scorpene-Class submarine is expected to be commissioned in 2023, and it has already delivered five of the class. Tragically, the MDL’s manufacturing capabilities and equipment are dormant and waiting for fresh orders because the Scorpene’s hulls were finished by 2018. This is a problem that keeps happening in India’s defence sector, and it results in significant intangible strategic losses in terms of independence.

The weather has been challenging for Project 75(I) as well. Defense Acquisition 2017 brought it under the Strategic Partnership concept. Indian and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) must be identified as partners in the model. MDL and Larsen & Toubro (L&T) were chosen as potential Indian partners for 2020. Original Equipment Manufacturers from South Korea, Russia, Spain, France, and Germany were among the five that were authorised. Media sources as of July 2022 claim that a second extension has been given, this time until December 2022, for submitting a response to the Request for Proposal (RFP). The Navy has also asked the Ministry of Defence for concessions on AIP and a few other contractual provisions.

16 conventional submarines, including eight Kilo Class, four French, and four German submarines, make up the Indian Navy. One French submarine is far into the operational induction process. Measures are also being taken to increase the lifespan of conventional submarines by 10 to 15 years in order to make up for the delay in submarine induction. However, the fact that 24 submarines sanctioned as part of a 30-year plan two decades ago are still not expected to be realised is a moot argument.

Decision-making reforms in national security
The two main pillars of India’s naval might are the aircraft carrier and the submarine. Both have a rocky developmental history due to, among other things, delays in making decisions and upholding procedural correctness over timely results. The pathologies share a common cause when considered in the context of the growing indigenous defence capabilities, despite the fact that they may take different forms. Lack of political patronage, direction, and oversight is the root cause of acknowledged and urgently needed improvements. Publicized reforms frequently fail to materialise because of the difficulty of carrying them out, as seen by the lack of a National Security Strategy and the inability to secure ongoing financial backing.

One of its present expressions is the baffling delay in the selection of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the essentially halted implementation of the desperately needed Theatre Command System.

INS Vikrant certainly provides us reason to be happy. But we must overcome our tendency as a nation to occasionally slack off in the face of our undeniable successes. This permits a false sense of security to take hold and wishes away our equally significant and obvious weaknesses on the front of national security.

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